معركة كاتر برا

معركة كاتر برا Battle of Quatre Bras
جزء من المائة يوم
كاتر برا (الفوج رقم 42 في فوت في الخليج) رسم وليام بارنز ولن
التاريخ 16 يونيو 1815 الموقع كاتر برا، بلجيكا اليوم 50°34′17″N 4°27′12″E النتيجة الانسحاب التكتيكي الانتصار الاستراتيجي للفرنسيين
المتحاربون
الامبراطورية الفرنسية	التحالف السابع: المملكة المتحدة هولندا هانوڤر ناسو دوق برونزويك
القادة والزعماء
ميشل ني جيروم بوناپرت	دوق ولنگتون الأمير وليام من أورانج فريدريش ڤيلهلم، دوق برونزڤيك-ڤولفن‌بوتل †
القوى
18,000 مشاة، 2,000 من سلاح الفرسان 32 بندقية	مبدئياً: 8,000 مدفعية، 16 بندقية في النهاية: 36,000 مدفعية، 70 بندقية
الضحايا والخسائر
4,140–4,400 قتيل أو جريم	4,800–5,600 قتيل أو جريح 200 أسير

المائة يوم:
حملة واترلو

390km
242miles

8

سانت هلنا

7

روشفور

6

واترلو

5

4

3

2

پاريس

1

إلبا

   

     المعركة الحالية     نابليون يقود     نابليون لا يقود

معركة كاتر برا Battle of Quatre Bras، بين جيوش ولنگتون الأنگلو-هولندية والجناح الأيسر لجيش الشمال بقيادة الجنرال ميشل ني، ودارت بالقرب من الممرات الحدودية الاستراتيجية لكاتر برا في 16 يونيو 1815. المعركة كانت نصر تكتيكي لولنجتون (إذ سيطر على الميدان بحلول الغروب)، ولكن بسبب منع "ني" ولنجتون من دعم الپروسيين، بقيادة Blücher، الذين كانوا يقاتلون الجيش الفرنسي الذي يقوده نابليون بونابرت في ليني، فقد كانت نصراً استراتيجياً للفرنسيين.

 تمهيد

خريطة حملة واترلو

بالرغم من أن قادة التحالف كان لديهم صورة شاملة للتحركات السابقة للحرب، إلا أن استراتيجية نابليون كانت في البداية ناجحة جداً.

Facing two armies (Wellington's arriving from the west and the Prussians under Field Marshall von Blücher from the east), Napoleon's overall strategy was to defeat each in turn, before these forces could join. Napoleon intended to cross the border into what is now Belgium (but was then part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands) without alerting the Coalition leaders and drive a wedge between their forces. He planned to defeat the Prussian army, forcing them to retreat eastward, and then turn to engage Wellington, driving his army back to the Channel coast.

Napoleon recognized that, if Wellington's Anglo-allied army could join with the Prussians, the combined force would be larger than his French army. The crossroads at Quatre Bras therefore became a strategic position, since if the French held this interchange, they could prevent Wellington's forces from moving south-eastward along the Nivelles-Namur road towards the Prussians, where Napoleon was planning to engage von Blücher on 16 June at Ligny.

Although the Coalition commanders were receiving intelligence, Napoleon's planning was initially successful. Wellington remarked: "Napoleon has humbugged me, by God; he has gained twenty-four hours' march on me."

While Wellington's instructions at the start of the campaign were to defend Brussels from the French, he was not sure what route Napoleon's army would follow; he also received (false) reports of a flanking maneuver through Mons to the southwest. Wellington first received reports of the outbreak of hostilities at around 15:00 on 15 June from the Prince of Orange, a Coalition commander. Within the next few hours, he received additional news that the French had skirmished early that morning with the Prussian First Corps under Lieutenant-General Graf von Zieten at Thuin (near Charleroi). These reports prompted Wellington at 18:00 to draft initial orders to concentrate his army. However, he was still uncertain precisely where to bring his forces together, and it was not until almost midnight, when he learned that the front near Mons was clear, that he ordered his army to move towards the Prussians.

Major-General Jean Victor de Constant Rebecque

This nine-hour delay meant it was too late for him to move his army in sufficient strength to provide von Blücher with support on 16 June at the Battle of Ligny. Wellington did not order his entire army to Quatre Bras on 16 June, still suspecting a flanking maneuver through Mons. The headquarters of the Anglo-allied First Corps (Prince of Orange's), however, decided to ignore Wellington's order that it should assemble in and around Nivelles, instead opting to take the initiative and converge on Quatre Bras.

Napoleon's original plan for 16 June was based on the assumption that the Coalition forces, which had been caught off guard, would not attempt a risky forward concentration; he intended therefore to push an advanced guard as far as Gembloux, for the purpose of feeling for and warding off von Blücher. To assist in this operation, the reserve would move first to Fleurus to reinforce Marshal Grouchy who was tasked with driving back the Prussian troops. However, once the French were in possession of Sombreffe, Napoleon planned to swing the reserve westwards to join with Marshal Ney, who—it was supposed—would have by that time secured the Quatre Bras crossroad.

Accordingly Marshal Ney, to whom III Cavalry Corps (Kellermann) was now attached, was to mass at Quatre Bras and push an advance guard 10 كيلومتر (6.2 mi) northward of that place, sending a connecting division at Marbais to link him with Grouchy. The center and left wing together would then make a night-march toward Brussels. The Coalition forces would thus be forcefully separated, and all that remained would be to destroy each in detail. Napoleon now awaited further information from his wing commanders at Charleroi, where he massed the VI Corps (Lobau's), to save it, if possible, from a harassing countermarch, as it appeared likely that it would only be needed for the march to Brussels.

The Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach tells the officers of his brigade to stand their ground at Quatre-Bras

On 15 June as the Prussian I Corps withdrew towards Ligny, there was a danger for the Coalition forces that Ney would be able to advance through Quatre Bras and take his objectives with little or no Coalition opposition. At the headquarters of the I Corps at Genappe (about five kilometres (3 miles) from Quatre Bras), Major-General Jean Victor de Constant Rebecque, chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, realized the danger and ordered Lieutenant-General Hendrik George de Perponcher Sedlnitsky, the commander of the 2nd Dutch Division, to dispatch his 2nd Brigade (Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach) to occupy Quatre Bras. This brigade, consisting of two regiments from Nassau, arrived at about 14:00 on 15 June. Prince Bernhard was able to deploy prior to the arrival of the first French scouts, lancers of the Guard Light Cavalry Division (Lefebvre-Desnouettes) who approached Quatre Bras. These French lancers were engaged at Frasnes, after which the Nassauers retreated to the Bois de Bossu, a thick patch of forest near Quatre Bras. "6:30 p.m. – some accounts say 5:30" General Lefebvre-Desnouëtte requested infantry support, but as night was approaching, and his infantry was strung out along Brussels-Charleroi road, Ney declined the request, instead deciding to camp for the night and approach Quatre Bras in force the following day. Early on the evening of 15 June, instead of obeying Wellington's order to concentrate the I Corps at Nivelles (which would have meant that the force occupying Quatre Bras would be abandoning the position), Rebecque ordered the 1st Brigade (Van Bylandt's brigade) of the 2nd Dutch Division to reinforce Prince Bernhard's 2nd Brigade.

By countermanding a direct order from Wellington and using his own initiative, Rebecque was responsible for the Battle being fought at Quatre Bras on the following day, thereby preventing the French from keeping the two coalition armies apart and destroying each of them in detail.

Ney spent the morning of 16 June massing his I and II corps, and reconnoitering the enemy at Quatre Bras, who, he was informed, had been reinforced. But up till noon he took no serious steps to capture the crossroads, which he could have done with relative ease. In the meantime, Grouchy reported from Fleurus that Prussians were coming up from Namur, but Napoleon does not appear to have attached much importance to this report. He was still at Charleroi when, between 09:00 and 10:00, further news reached him that hostile forces had concentrated at Quatre Bras. He at once wrote to Ney saying that these could only be some of Wellington's troops, and that Ney was to concentrate his force and crush what was in front of him, adding that Ney was to send all reports to Fleurus. Then, leaving Marshal Lobau's force provisionally at Charleroi, Napoleon hastened to Fleurus, arriving about 11:00.

 اللقاء عند مطحنة الهواء في بوسي

Shortly after 11:00, Wellington observed that the French were not in any great force at Frasnes (south of Quatre Bras). At the same time, accounts reached him that the Prussians, in position at Ligny, were being menaced by the advance of a considerable French force. Wellington, accompanied by his staff and a small escort of cavalry, rode off to hold a conference with von Blücher, whom he met at the Windmill of Bussy (often referred to as the Windmill of Brye) between Ligny and Brye. Because this windmill was at the highest point of the Prussian position, the leaders were able to observe the French preparatory deployments prior to their attack.

These observations led Wellington to conclude that Napoleon was bringing the main force of his army to bear against the Prussians; he at once proposed to assist von Blücher by first advancing straight upon Frasnes and Gosselies, as soon as he was able to concentrate sufficient force, and then attacking the French from their left and rear, thus providing a powerful diversion to aid the Prussians, since von Blücher's right wing was the weakest and most exposed, and considering Napoleon's movements was the most likely to be attacked.

The primary sources do not agree on what was said at the meeting. They all agree that Wellington promised aid to Blücher, but they disagree on whether Wellington made an unequivocal promise of aid, or whether Wellington made it clear that his ability to give timely assistance to Blücher was only possible if his forces were not engaged before he could send aid.

Siborne, writing from eyewitness accounts, records it thus:

"Upon a calculation being made, however, of the time which would elapse ere the Duke would be able to collect the requisite force for undertaking this operation, and of the possibility of Blucher being defeated before it could be carried into effect, it was considered preferable that Wellington should, if practicable, move to the support of the Prussian Right by the Namur road. But a direct support of this kind was necessarily contingent on circumstances, and subject to the Duke's discretion. The latter having expressed his confident expectation of being enabled to afford the desired support, as also of his succeeding in concentrating, very shortly, a sufficient force to assume the offensive, rode back to Quatre Bras."

 المتخاصمون

البرونزويك أثناء معركة كاتر برا.

انظر أيضاً: Order of battle of the Battle of Quatre Bras and Order of Battle of the Waterloo Campaign

At the beginning of the battle the left wing of the Armée du Nord, with 18,000 men (including 2,000 cavalry and 32 guns) under Marshal Michel Ney, faced 8,000 infantry and 16 guns, under the command of William, Prince of Orange. The Dutch (with the Nassauers of 2nd Brigade) were thinly deployed south of the crossroads of Quatre Bras. Fresh allied troops started to arrive two hours later, along with Wellington, who took over command of the allied forces. As the day wore on, fresh Dutch, British and Brunswickers arrived faster than fresh French troops (who eventually numbered about 24,000).

 المعركة

الفوج رقم 28 في كاتر برا - (حوالي الساعة 17:00) - إليزابث ثومپسون - (1875)

لقد كان الطريق بين الجيشين المتحالفين (جيش بلوخر وجيش ويلنجتون) يمتد من نامور عَبْر سومبريف إلى كاتر - برا - (أربعة جيوش) ومن ثمّ غرباً (حيث يتسع الطريق عن ذي قبل) من الحدود الفرنسية البلجيكية عند شارلروي فشمالاً من واترلو إلى بروكسل. وكان هدف نابليون الأول هو الاستيلاء على كاتر - برا ومن ثم يُوصد الطريق بين الجيشين الحليفين. وكان نابليون قد أصدر تعليمات بأن تتقارب الكتائب الثلاث من جيشه (جيش الشمال) في 14 يونيو عند نهر سامبر في مواجهة شارلروي. وانضم هو إلى واحدة من الكتائب الثلاث وأمر الكتائب الثلاث جميعا بعبور النهر إلى الأرض البلجيكية نحو الساعة الثالثة من صباح 15 يونيو، وتمَّ هذا، فاستولوا بسهولة على شارلروي بعد أن هزموا حاميتها البروسية الصغيرة.

وعلى أية حال، ففي الوقت نفسه انهزم الجنرال لويس دي بورمون لصالح الحلفاء وأفضى إلى ضباط بلوخر بخطط نابليون. لكن الحَذِر (بلوخر) كان قد استنتج هذه الخطط وبالتالي فقد كان قد أرسل جانبا من جيشه غربا إلى سومبريف وانضم إليه في نحو الساعة الرابعة من صباح 15 يونيو. لقد قسم نابليون الآن جيشه إلى ميمنة بقيادة جروشي وميسرة بقيادة ني وقوة احتياطية بقيادة درو دَرْلو بالقرب من شارلروي لتهب لنجدة جروشي أو نَيْ على وفق ما تمليه الظروف. وكان على جروشي أن يتقدم شمالا بشرق نحو سومبريف لمواجهة بلوخر. وكان على نَيْ أن يتوجه شمالاً للاستيلاء على كاتر - برا وأن يمنع في كل الأحوال قوات ويلنجتون من الانضمام إلى قوات بلوخر. ولأن نابليون نفسه كان يتوقع صداما حادا مع بلوخر، فقد ركب مع جروشي.

ونَيْ الذي كان حتى الآن أشجع الشجعان راح طوال 15 و 16 يونيو يتبع سياسة الحذر التي عطلت خطط نابليون بشكل سيء. لقد توجه شمالا من شالروا وطرد البروسيين من جوسِّيل ومن ثمَّ توقّف مخافة مواجهة قوات ويلنجتون الأكثر عددا. لقد أرسل فصيلة خيّالة (فرسان) لدراسة الموقع عند كاتر - برا فعادت له بتقرير مُفاده أنها خالية من قوات العدو، فقاد 3000 من رجاله للاستيلاء عليها اعتقادا منه أن هذا سيكون كافيا لكن في الوقت الذي رأى فيه كاتر - برا، كانت قوات الأمير بيرنهارد الساكس - فيماري البالغ عددها 0004 مقاتل قد استولت عليها، وكان بيرنهارد يصحب معه أربعة مدافع، فاستدار نَيْ عائدا إلى جوسيل وراح ينتظر هناك تعليمات أخرى. وأرسل بيرنهارد رسالة إلى ويلنجتون طالبا أن يحضر بقواته الرئيسية إلى كاتر - برا مخافة أن تأتي قوات ني سريعا لحصارها.

 النتائج

وفي الساعة الثالثة صباح 15 يونيو تلقى ولنجتون في بروكسل أخبارا مفادها أن جيش نابليون قد عبر إلى بلجيكا، واحتفظ ويلنجتون بقواته في حالة استعداد قرب العاصمة البلجيكية ظناً منه أن نابليون سينفذ خطته المعتادة بالإسراع للقيام بهجوم جانبي (على جناح العدو). وفي تلك الليلة كان هو وكثيرون من ضباطه الرجال الشجعان منهمكين مع النسوة الجميلات إذ كانوا في حفل راقص أعدته الدوقة ريشمون وفي أثناء الحفل تلقى في منتصف الليل الرسالة التي تُفيد أن كاتر-برا في خطر، فأصدر أوامره بهدوء لضباطه بالاستعداد للانطلاق في بكور الصباح، أما هو فلم يُعكّر صفو الحفل الراقص وظل يرقص حتى الساعة الثالثة صباحا.

ناپليون أذهلني، يا إلهي؛ لقد كسب مسيرة أربع وعشرين ساعة أمامي

— دوق ولنگتون،

 الأعقاب

المقالة الرئيسية: Waterloo Campaign: Quatre Bras to Waterloo

The battle cost Ney 4,000 men to Wellington's 4,800. Although the allies had won the field, the French prevented them from coming to the aid of the Prussians at the Battle of Ligny. Wellington's Anglo-allied army, upon learning of the Prussian defeat, was forced to retreat north along the Brussels road further away from the Prussians, who retreated north-east towards Wavre. There has been much debate about what would have happened if d'Erlon's I Corps had engaged at either Ligny or Quatre Bras. As he did not, Napoleon chose to follow Wellington with the bulk of his forces and two days later met him at Waterloo.

The allied tactical victory at Quatre Bras did prevent Ney from controlling these strategic crossroads. This in turn slowed down the French advance, thereby allowing Wellington to take a position on the Waterloo battlegrounds, which would otherwise not be possible and would have led, as some believe, to an allied defeat.

After the Waterloo campaign, Wellington was given the title Prince of Waterloo by the Dutch King William I. Along with the title came lands, which encompassed a large area of the battlefield of Quatre Bras. As landowner, the Duke and his successors had a large part of the Bossu wood felled for timber.

• Monuments
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  In the church of Waterloo the victims of both battles of Quatre-Bras and Waterloo (16 and 18 June 1815) are associated in the same remembrance

• 

  Monument erected in remembrance of the battle

• 

  Monument to the British and Hanoverian Troops.
• 

  Brunswick Monument.
• 

  Monument to the Dutch Cavalry regiments.
• 

  Monument to the Belgians.

 انظر أيضاً

• قائمة المعارك الناپليونية

 المصادر

كتب

• Hofschröer, Peter; 1815, The Waterloo Campaign: The German Victory; Greenhill Books (London); ISBN 1-85367-368-4
• Hofschröer, Peter; 1815, The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, his German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras; Greenhill Books (London); ISBN 1-85367-304-8

مقالات

• Anonymous. Detailed account of the Battle of Quatre Bras, 1815. This website considers that English language articles over emphasise the British contribution to the campaign and emphasises other nations contributions.
• De Wit, Pierre. The campaign of 1815: a study A detailed account of the Battle of Quatre Bras.
• Niderost, Eric. Battle of Quatre Bras, website of The History Net

 قراءات إضافية

• Anonymous. The Battle of Quatre Bras
• Fletcher, Ian; ‘A Desperate Business’: Wellington, the British Army and the Waterloo Campaign; Spellmount Publishers
• Libert, Alfons. The Battle of Quatre-Bras
• Muilwijk, Erwin. Contribution of the Netherlands Mobile Army during the 1815 campaign Gives full account of the Dutch troops that fought at Quatre-Bras, based on many unknown primary sources.
• Robinson, Mike. The battle of Quatre Bras. The History Press 2009. New topographical mapping and personal accounts

 وصلات خارجية

سبقه Siege of Gaeta (1815)

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